Stormfront: The New Great Game Over Asia

Joint Chinese-Russian operations near Japan escalate, while North Korea draws closer to Moscow

By Michael Newman

Tokyo: When Haneda Airport opened up to international traffic in 2010, passenger growth – with the exception of COVID-19 – has continued to set new records, growing 29 percent alone in 2024 to over 23 million foreign passengers.

Unfortunately, over the same period, the Japanese Ministry of Defense (JMoD) has become concerned by the sustained growth in other air traffic – namely military aircraft surveillance by foreign powers.

The JMoD stated in its 2024 Defense White Paper that scrambles to intercept Chinese military aircraft by the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) surged from 96 in 2010 to 479 in 2023. While below the peak of 851 recorded in 2016, Japan’s security environment has dramatically changed.

Russia has also been a significant challenge for Japan. While the number of scrambles by JASDF fighters intercepting Russian military aircraft approaching its airspace has declined since 2010 from 264 to 174, of greater concern is the commencement of joint surveillance exercises with China since 2019.

All told, since 2010, the JMoD has recorded almost 11,200 scrambles to intercept Russian and Chinese military aircraft approaching its sovereign borders. That is more than twice a day.

At sea, the statistics are not much better. The number of announcements made by Chinese combatant ships and aircraft carriers around the Southwestern Islands and the Soya and Tsugaru Straits jumped from three to 42. In 2023, Chinese Coast Guard vessels were active in the contiguous waters around the Senkaku Islands, with activity reaching 352 days and the total number of vessels reaching 1,282 – both the highest ever.

Russia notes the importance of the Asia-Pacific region to its own regional security. Russia is strengthening its relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries where it has conducted naval exercises. The first was held in the inshore waters of Indonesia in December 2021. Whether such cooperation might eventually lead to Russia establishing airbases in Indonesia – a topic raised in Australia’s recent election campaign – is beside the point. There is clearly dialogue which would undoubtedly be tied to further weapons exports. Indonesia currently possesses a small fleet of Russian-made Sukhoi fighter jets. It would not be a surprise to see a deal struck where Moscow provides fighter training alongside a potential sale.

Beyond Indonesia, vessels from the Russian Pacific Fleet visited eight countries in Southeast Asia and South Asia between November and December 2023. In November, Russia conducted the first joint naval exercise with Myanmar in what was dubbed the Myanmar-Russia Maritime Security Exercise (MARUMEX).

In September 2023, North Korea’s Chairman Kim Jong-un visited the Vostochny Cosmodrome—a key Russian spaceport near the Chinese border—and held his first summit with President Putin in four years.

North Korean missile tests may have slowed in number but that is more a function of the advanced sophistication of the type being evaluated. North Korea’s participation in the Ukraine conflict via troop deployment and materiel has led to anxieties in Nagatacho, Japan’s political district, that technology transfer with respect to ballistic missiles will be part of the exchange.

Japan has extremely challenging geopolitics to contend with, not helped by history. South Korea, despite the chequered past with Japan, is much more aligned with its former enemy as they share common regional troubles. In November 2022, the Republic of Korea entered into partnership with Japan and the US on sharing early missile warning data. Trilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific continues to this day.

Which brings us back to the bilateral between Australia and Japan. Energy security underpins Japan’s (and South Korea’s) national security. For Japan, the potential sale of Mogami-class frigates to the Royal Australian Navy is more of a sign of willingness to expand mutual collaboration across a wide variety of industries, far beyond defence – especially energy. The retroactive Safeguard Mechanism, a carbon emissions regulation introduced by the Australian government, and the mixed messages on coal and gas are making the situation more complex than it needs to be.

Australia needs to understand the complex nature of Japan’s self-defence, especially when the language of the JMoD has changed from passive defence to dynamic deterrence.

Amendments to Article IX of Japan’s constitution – which renounces war and prohibits Japan from maintaining traditional armed forces – have been garnering more public support in recent years. Slain Prime Minister Shinzo Abe managed to reinterpret Article IX to allow Japan to assist allies abroad under what is termed "collective defence" in 2015. However, the security situation will undoubtedly push Japan to realise it may need further changes in line with Abe’s legacy to ensure sovereignty is maintained.

Michael Newman has four decades of business experience in North Asia and served as NSW’s Senior Trade and Investment Commissioner to the region.

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